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An Anthropology of Belief and a Theory
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In the social sciences of religion, the temptation to over-interpret jeopardises
the description and analysis of religious beliefs, or more specifically modes of
belief. Sometimes these are understood – implicitly – as indications of exoticism,
or deviations from a rational norm needing to be explained by sociocultural
factors. At other times, the reorganisation of belief systems (for example indicative
of either belonging without adhering to content or adhering without belonging)
is considered a significant sign of the contemporary evolution of religion. Thus
beliefs are often treated as synonymous with homogeneous, shared cultural
representations, as if adherence, acceptance and the mode of belief were self-
evident 1.
Believing in a non verifiable statement, thinking that incredible things exist:
this is one of Homo Sapiens’ specificities (A. Piette, 2013). But what does the
act of believing consist of? How can we characterise this moment of adherence
to religious statements? Half-believing, believing contradictory things, sceptical
believing, floating between wonder and credulity, being able to change “pro-
grams of truth”, hesitating or remaining indifferent when facing the choice
between truth or fiction: herein is the multiplicity of attitudes and modalities of
belief that Paul Veyne highlighted brilliantly in his analysis of Greek myths
(P. Veyne, 1988 [1983]). From this diversity, Jon Elster summarised three contra-
dictory belief types operating in peaceful coexistence: those belonging to different
sets of data, one of which trumps the other when they meet (the child who
believes that hot water comes from a tank in the basement while also believing
that water it is carried into the house by two underground pipes, one for cold
and one for hot); those that coexist with regard to the same object but follow
different modalities (the Romans who created a cult around their divinised
emperor, but did not address him for serious matters); those that coexist within
one and the same idea (the knowledge of the natural destiny of a corpse and
the human inability to think through one’s own annihilation) (J. Elster, 1993:
chapter 1).
1. This text has been translated by Matthew Cunningham.
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It is therefore a matter of setting aside the usual image of people adhering
to beliefs either in conformity with or in spite of those instituted by society,
being conscious and logical within themselves, always being serious in the actions
they perform, and therefore always being over-interpreted in relation to events
they most often experience simply and mundanely. The point is not to replace
this with the image of unbelieving, unconscious, inconsistent people who lack
serious action, but rather that of people who believe without believing (J. Mair,
2012).
Large-scale ethnographic study, in association with the notion of culture,
runs the risk of disregarding individual differences, which are overshadowed by
the cultural representations thus collated. Matching an individual’s beliefs with
representations that are public, pervasive or orthodoxly organised, and linking
these to the coherence of a singular cultural entity distracts attention from con-
crete behaviours and actions. This is not only to ignore individual variations but
also to assume that individuals have full access to entirely transparent representa-
tions. This is to forget the vague and sometimes ephemeral dimension of acts of
believing.
A phenomenographic approach focused on particular variations, individual
expressions and isolated moments is needed if one is to get closer to modes of
belief 2. This article must be read as a consideration of “what goes on” when
someone is believing. It aims to present theoretical reference points with a view
to establishing an anthropology of hesitant and fragmentary modalities of belief.
The examples provided are drawn mainly from a study of Catholic parishes in
France. The close observation of liturgy and various meetings between parishion-
ers on the one hand and personal interviews on the other enabled me to obtain
the data that follows (A. Piette, 1999 et 2003).
Religious statements
“Jesus is alive.” “The spirit of the Lord is present among us.” These are the
statements one usually hears in Catholic religious ceremonies. They have at least
three characteristics (P. Boyer, 1994). They contradict the intuitive expectations
and ordinary anticipations of individuals, such as when they attribute the quality
“alive” to a person who is known to be dead. They are composed of notions or
concepts that have a certain complexity for those who utter them – the “believ-
ers” themselves – and are vague in meaning (such as the notion of spirit, the
idea of presence, and many others), making them sources of doubtful interpreta-
tions and persistent controversies. Finally, they do not imply – again, for the
“believers” themselves – a necessary link to other statements or behaviours that
would seem to follow logically and directly from them. Would any Catholic
2. See the commentary of Lamine (2008) and the analysis of Luca (2013a and 2013b).
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asserting Christ’s “real presence” be prepared to search for physical traces of this?
Dan Sperber uses the term “semi-propositional” to describe the contents of a
mental representation that is incompletely established (D. Sperber, 1985 [1982]: 71).
The believer does not fully pursue the propositional logic by which a representa-
tion identifies one and only one proposition. Since it opens an array of interpreta-
tions that might clarify this content (without there being any single “right”
interpretation), semi-propositional representations allow a kind of loosening in
face of vague contents (ibid.: 71-73).The individual does not receive this semi-
propositional content as a fact but as a representation that involves a certain
mental vagueness, which does not prevent him or her from having confidence in
both the authority that issues the statement and the orthodoxy of its representation.
Indeed it is quite the contrary; the “mysteries” that are beliefs, often recog-
nised as such by the “natives”, are preserved and transmitted by virtue of the
trust accorded to the source of these statements. This gives good reason to believe
despite the uncertainty and doubt that these statements arouse. Although the
French verb “croire” points to this internal contradiction (M. Ruel, 1982), where
an assertion coexists alongside that which impedes the propositional advancement
of its contents, we would like in what follows to emphasise a mode of experience
that is not necessarily associated with this lexical usage. Every act of believing,
whatever its nature, is linked to cognitive vagueness. Take for example, the
remarkable mind map (which can be interpreted as a set of semi-propositional
representations) of an octogenarian who subscribes to the idea of the immortality
of the soul but wishes to delay Heaven as long as possible, while at the same
time desiring to live on in the memory of his descendants, and ask in addition
that his loved ones place a valued object in his final resting place, and that they
do not forget to look after his grave. From this Paul Veyne extracts the following
meanings: “one believes in Heaven, one is afraid of being a corpse, one feels
one’s future death will be a kind of sleep, one does not want to be neglected or
forgotten like a dog” (P. Veyne, 1992 [1976]: 249). According to Veyne, “only
the first of these four modalities is influenced by religious beliefs; but, even in a
population that believes in the Resurrection, the three other experiences persist”.
He explains: “it would be a mistake to believe that religion is coextensive to
culture; some attitudes to the beyond vary according to beliefs, but only some;
faith in personal immortality did not prevent Christians from also wanting to
survive in their descendants...” (P. Veyne, 1992 [1976]: 247-249). Someone slides
a few photos into a coffin just before it is closed. He or she knows that the
corpse will not be able to use these objects but offers them anyway... At the
moment of the gesture, it is impossible to strengthen this act of believing mentally
without at the same time summoning one’s critical knowledge. The individual
prefers to keep his or her semi-propositional representations below the level of
consciousness; this is the minimal internalisation that makes it possible to man-
age the incompatibilities in this case. It is as if he or she perceives a “risk” in
taking the reflexion further.
280 - Archives de sciences sociales des religions
The contents of beliefs refer to sources of different types. The origin of a
semi-propositional statement can be the ultimate authority of an institution (the
church for example), which, as Michel de Certeau has said, has the ability to
refine and control a coherent doctrine and link members to a common affiliation
(M. de Certeau, 1981: 381). But the institutional guarantee can be set aside and
replaced by a voice of scepticism or critical attitude (one’s own or that of others),
leading to selectiveness with regard to what is worth believing. Once a few fabu-
lous details and far-fetched fantasies have been ousted, the believer can retain a
kind of essential core of the church’s dogmas. Semi-propositional statements can
be disconnected even more easily from institutional authority and become ideas
that float in the current climate. Flexible and mobile, they constitute a diffuse
imagination supported by fluid, tolerant networks and are often reinforced by
their success in the media and by the interest they arouse in others. They speak
to an isolated distraction, a latent question or a relationship incentive. In that
case, the others who believe represent the authority (M. de Certeau, 1981: 374).
This explains why opinion polls are conducted and confident witnesses are pre-
sented in the media. It is a specific procedure that makes it known that others
believe, that they have positive views on the existence of the beyond. There is
also allegorical expression, for example the beauty of nature as a sign of some-
thing else, something “more”. Based on prior trust in a religious authority, this
allegory can trigger new trust in the orthodoxy of an institution.
Telling one’s beliefs
Responding to the researcher: “Yes, I believe that Jesus Christ is the son of
God” does not amount to conviction. It is the conveying of an “opinion” or
“piece of information” – in this case about one’s own religious ideas. It appears
that the phrase itself can constitute a bad model for conceiving belief: it is based
on the association of “precise verbal expression to convictions that lack the hard
edges verbalization endows them with” (D. Dennett, 1987: 21). But at the same
time, the positive answer clearly shows that the interviewee thinks various reali-
ties (God, the resurrection) really exist. Believing is not just playing along for
the duration of a book or film. It is also retaining the thought after the religious
celebration is over and, possibly, expressing it to the anthropologist.
The responses and comments that the believer offers the anthropologist do
not make the meaning of his or her beliefs clear. Their distinctive features must
therefore be identified. They will help us to understand the management of reli-
gious statements in real life. With this in mind, I have questioned Catholics about
the idea of resurrection, not to get them to give me the key to their beliefs, but
to discover the ways in which they link belief statements together. The interview
imposes a certain bias since they are asked for “information” on life after death
and the resurrection. It is up to them to respond and make a series of statements.
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So what do we find? The responses revolve around the idea of a spiritual life
after earthly life, and this possibility is presented as a “mystery” that is capable
of uniting the spirits of all people and creating a world of “peace and light”.
Spiritual life is described as a state of “love to the highest degree”: it is to live
“in God’s love”. The foundations of the possibility of this spiritual life are the
qualities of God: “he is infinitely powerful and he will offer us something unex-
pected”; “he is someone good fighting to destroy evil. This absence of evil is
impossible in this world. There is a future for humanity beyond our way of
thinking and our space”; “I have strong faith in the goodness of a God who
creates, and real happiness means penetrating beyond death”; “God loves people
to the point that he can do all...”.
The terms used to suggest this spiritual life (love, peace, happiness, ...) are
polysemic and vague. Most often, there is an explicit refusal to imagine and
describe what lies beyond death: “I’m not trying to imagine it. You shouldn’t
try to find it in a human model”; “I don’t really have a conception”. Based on
their certainty that “another” world exists, its qualities can be a matter of indif-
ference: “maybe it’s bad, but I don’t care”; “I admit it’s not something I’m
worried about”.
When respondents give more precise information about this other world, one
of the recurring characteristics of their mode of expression is the presence of
mental restrictions that modalize and even deny the described quality: “The
resurrection of Christ means something, but I don’t understand it”; “I think
there’s something there, maybe”; “I believe in the communion of saints. But no
one ever said anything about it”. In fact, modalizing in this way has just as much
of an impact on the metaphorical interpretation of the other world as it does
on the literal interpretation. It is as if both interpretations could not be pursued
to their conclusion. Thus, the metaphorical version is sometimes strongly
expressed in a way that would appear to deny post-mortem resurrection: “The
resurrection means that dead people are still around, even today; in the sense
that I’m talking about them. What we experienced together left traces that still
affect me. The resurrection means that the link existing between us is stronger
than death”. But this sort of interpretation comes to a halt as soon as it runs up
against “trust in God”, and the respondent recognises the inadequacy of words
to explain it: “We have no images to describe it. It’s a bit like if a blind person
had to describe the world. But I believe that those who have passed away will
be in a position to explain it to us”. So there is “something”...
It is important to stress that mental restrictions also affect the literalist inter-
pretation that Catholics use to express the idea of the resurrection of the body
and of being reunited with loved ones in a specific place. Several types of modali-
zation can be identified:
– Incomprehension, or at least the professed inability to know: “It’s an open
question. Christ said nothing explicit on the subject. I’m no intellectual myself”;
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“on the resurrection scenario, nothing can be said”; “Personally, I’ve never
delved into those questions. I had seminary friends who did, but they all let it
drop”; “I don’t understand”.
– Doubt tinged with hope: “I think there’s something, maybe. I hope so”.
– Irony usually expressed through laughter, in response to the request for a
description of the resurrection, particularly in relation to being personally reu-
nited with loved ones.
– The rejection of one’s own past belief: “I used to believe in the physical resur-
rection. But now I’m less categorical”.
– The appeal to theological knowledge: “In Jewish anthropology, the resurrec-
tion of the flesh does not mean the resuscitation of the dead.”
There are also denials – sometimes adamant – of the literalist interpretation
of the resurrection: “That’s one part of the creed I’m sceptical about. I don’t
believe in the resurrection in the flesh”; “the way it works isn’t that bones are
taken out to put a guy back together. Heaven can’t be conceived in terms of
astrophysics”; “I struggle with the idea that the resurrection is a resuscitation
of corpses”. At most, these literalist images can be pedagogical means of reassur-
ance: “one of our children became very distressed about death. He was com-
pletely reassured the night I told him that there is a place where we all find each
other, and that existing links are not broken. You know, the hackneyed image”.
But these denials, like the metaphorical interpretation and the literalist ver-
sion, are not pursued to their conclusion because they are positively re-formed
to connect with ideas of love and spiritual happiness, which make it possible to
reconnect with the hope of reuniting with loved ones and maintaining interper-
sonal bonds after death. We are therefore witnessing a process that distinguishes
between what life after death can and cannot be. These are the most frequent
statements: “There can be no resurrection without the communion of saints.
I often wonder how I’ll find my father. I can’t imagine him without his caresses,
the look in his eye. He expressed so many things through caresses with the backs
of his fingernails. I believe I’ll find him. Not his fingernails but his heart and
his tenderness”; “I don’t think we’ll be any different. Except for our bodies”;
“people’s faults will be gone. I think that with my husband, I’ll no longer have
a husband-wife relationship, but we’ll still have a special bond”; “God placed
within us relationships and connections that make us who we are. He’s not going
to demolish what he put into us. So we’ll rediscover these connections after death.
We won’t find ourselves sitting together side-by-side, with reassembled families
and people who recognise each other. The relationship will have a more spiritual
form, love will be the essential thing”; “The resurrection doesn’t mean leaving
the tomb; I don’t see billions of people resuscitated with their bodies but I believe
there will be a dimension that goes beyond myself, my abilities. It is something
exceptional within God’s love, with all other people. There is no loss of humanity.
We will all be there”; “I’m sure I’ll find them; I won’t recognise them but I’ll
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see them through the resurrected Christ. My faith makes me believe that there
is something eternal in everyone”, “I know I’m destined to exist in God. It’s so
amazing that those dearest to us can never be absent. That’s the highest degree
of love. But I don’t know if our loved ones will see us. Christ wasn’t recognised”.
These are various modalities used by Catholics when they speak about death
and the resurrection – that is, how they deal with a set of signifiers (containers)
about which there is no strict agreement on the corresponding signifieds (or
contents):
– the maintenance of the division between a material world and a spiritual world
whose possible existence one believes in;
– irony in relation to the idea that there is no guaranteed content and that most
people seek content or keep content in their heads;
– the rejection of the notion of resuscitated bodies;
– taking the question seriously, while expressing regret about the uncertainty of
the answers;
– dual language, which involves speaking in one way with some people, another
way with others (at a public meeting: “no, the resurrection is not the resuscita-
tion of dead people”, behind the scenes (it was a dinner): “I can’t do away
with the image of Christ leaving the tomb”, then making fun of yourself for this
admitted contradiction; also the dual language of irony (or dismissiveness)
behind the scenes and liturgical assertions in public;
– the institutional authority of the priest, sometimes applied in liturgies, some-
times reasserted during discussions (as opposed to self-disqualifying attitudes);
– the simultaneous assertion: on the one hand, that representations have limita-
tions when applied to transcendent and inexpressible realities and, on the other
hand, that these are a pedagogical necessity;
– the logic of uncertainty, that is, a dialectical logic that expresses, in different
ways, the life and non-life of the dead (it isn’t material but it’s real; it’s not about
physically finding the people we’ve loved, but it’s...);
– the idea that an answer to questions about content is not important, the impli-
cation being that the religious lies elsewhere.
Believers seem to be torn between literalist discourse of the kind that church
discourse never really escapes – and which in any case retains ambiguity (with
the notions of “real presence”, “transubstantiation”, ...) – and their desire to be
in God’s presence. On the one hand, there is “belief” in the materiality of resur-
rected life, which they do not want to believe in... and at the same time they
give the impression that they don’t dare not believe in it, or at the very least
that they believe that they believe in the beyond. On the other hand there is
love: the simple desire to love, to express love and to be in the presence of the
loved person... perhaps in hope of “something” more. Hence the almost infinite
mental restrictions.
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Metaphorical sentences are literally false. Believing cannot consist in approach-
ing religious statements as metaphors, i.e. as literally false. Believers do not per-
ceive these statements as literally true, but they do not consider them literally
false either. This is their extraordinary specificity. The act of believing is part of
this uncertain oscillation: “It’s not literal, so is it a metaphor? No. But neither can
it really be literal... without consequently being a metaphor”. Believers perceive
religious statements as neither realistic, associated with a reference and a precise
reality, nor as unrealistic, without any referential counterpart. Believing consists
in referring to religious statements, thinking or feeling that they are not meta-
phorical expressions, but not really accepting their contents literally. This oscilla-
tion, this hesitation and this mental interspace are fascinating. They make up
the act of believing. This does not mean that there are not occasional moments
when believers make more distinct claims to doubt or certainty, when they keep
their acceptance or their modulation in the background, as we will see. But to
believe is to enter into this oscillation.
This is a crucial point. As we will discover, the rules governing the links
between belief statements show that every answer given is part of a constantly
rebounding movement, in the course of which each statement gives way to the
next while constituting a critical axis relative to the previous one. This is what
happens in practice: a movement of reversal and perpetual hesitation between
various conceptions of the resurrection of the dead: it’s literal, no it’s not literal,
it’s symbolic; no it’s not symbolic, it’s more than that; no it’s not literal, but
it’s...; and so on. This proceeds according to a movement that asserts, that denies,
that questions the relevance of one point of view or another. Because how is
one to state that paradoxical proposition “Jesus, son of God, dead and alive...”,
which would be hard for anyone to understand, other than through this game of
reversals, hesitations and juxtapositions between contradictory points of view?
Acts of believing
There are other situations in which semi-propositional statements are spoken,
recited or chanted. In religious ceremonies, many assertions like “Jesus lives”
are made, often in association with declarations of love or fidelity, or with
expressions of praise. They are devices for establishing co-presence with the
absent, who is made present in the statement through the aforesaid declaration
or through every entity (object, icon, holy bread) that represents the being in
question (A. Piette, 1999; M. Finch, 2009). The presence of the divine being
also reflects specific interlocutory relationships in which the absent addressee is
explicitly solicited to enter the situation using a variety of linguistic and gestural
forms. Just as internal dialogue is a way of preserving the presence of an absent
person, prayer or declarations of love are specific techniques for remaining in
the presence of the divine being. The intelligibility of these statements cannot
depend on the presence of the being to which they are addressed.
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From this point of view, semi-propositional statements constitute possible
points of departure – within a specific spatial-temporal situation – in a process
of emotional evocation which activates the presence of the absent being in a variety
of ways. We know that no ritual necessarily implies, by virtue of its performance,
a mental attitude that corresponds with it perfectly, and implies even less an
unproblematic adherence to any explicit or implicit meaning of the rite. Bourdieu
often states that rituals are performed because “that’s what is done” or “it has
to be done” and one has no choice but to do it, without needing to know what
the rituals mean (P. Bourdieu, 1992 [1981]: 18). But if, like Bourdieu, one moves
the act of believing away from mental representations in order to make it a
product of sub-verbal and sub-conscious dispositions, this leaves no room for
analysing forms of adherence and the experience of human beings in the process
of believing, or more specifically the believers’ modes of interactional presence.
It is a “dispositionalist” reading of the act of believing. The co-presence of men
and gods, inserted into a particular context, according to specific circumstances,
and mediated by objects, can take on different expressions. It can also appear
outside of collective contexts. In any case it is a temporary meeting between a
prevailing semi-propositional representation and an emotional disposition or
intellectual process proper to the individual who is present in the situation
(J. Bazin, 1991). I would say that this momentary encounter is a state of belief,
more specifically an act of believing. Here is a non-exhaustive list of modalities
of the act of believing:
– Addressing the supernatural being. A man and woman are in front of a closed
chapel containing a Virgin Mary; the man removes his hat; they both mumble
a few prayers for two or three minutes before leaving. Here there would be a
“state of body” to borrow Bourdieu’s term, a “bodily hexis” and a “linguistic
habitus” in a way that would seem self-evident, but I would add that it is only
a temporary state. They are in a state of half belief.
– Personal presence. Alone alongside other worshippers during a ceremony, a
young man weeps during the story of the Last Supper and the transformation
of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. The semi-propositional
content of the priest’s statement invites the man, in accordance with his own
interpretation and his personal evocation, to experience “transubstantiation”.
He really believes that Jesus is present.
– Directed vision. This is the individual who, in a particular state of grace, sees
the supernatural being (Jesus, the Virgin Mary...), which he or she can describe
according to particular traits. This individual believes that the supernatural being
really exists. Triggered by a particular emotional process, this “vision” is not
independent on the content of prevailing semi-propositional representations.
– Link to an emotion. A man, convinced that the “final judgement” does not
exist but conscious of having made a serious mistake, is haunted by fear of his
fate to the point of asking a religious authority for forgiveness. Another, alone
in a house in which a dead person lies, associates the slightest nocturnal sound
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with a manifestation of the dead person in a particular form. Even if he is con-
vinced that ghosts do not exist, this type of emotional reaction connected with
latent semi-propositional content (ghosts do exist) constitutes a state of belief,
though certainly an ephemeral one. In these cases, the individuals believe X anyway.
– Inevitable gesture. A person who, as mentioned above, slips personal memen-
tos like photographs into a coffin before it is closed, to accompany the deceased.
There is tension between the unshakeable need to preserve a connection with
the deceased by means of the object and awareness of the pointlessness of this
gesture (noting that he or she does not want this awareness to become too obvious).
The person does not really believe X.
– Positive mental connection. The operation usually takes place outside the
actual ritual. It enables the individual to mentally construct, from latent represen-
tations, the image of a situation that he or she either hopes for (being reunited
with parents after death) or fears (the burning of his or her body in hell...). This
type of connection can be associated with a deciphering of everyday events, in
which the believer finds communicative “signs”.
Shifts
A believer’s everyday life is no doubt structured by the synchronisations that
exist between him or herself and the supernatural being. Someone who genuinely
and regularly believes is likely to produce frequent and positive mental connec-
tions, as will someone who really believed X. But it will also happen sometimes
that this person believes X anyway, or that he or she does not really believe X.
When analysing the real life “management” of religious statements, the eth-
nographer’s attention is necessarily drawn to an element that I consider crucial:
the principle of shifting from the moment when the individual enters into a state
of belief (in which he or she “performs” an ephemeral act of believing) to the
collapse of this state due to ordinary distractions and wandering thoughts, even
scepticism and irony. This is what Paul Veyne calls “quotidian mediocrity”: “[it]
is precisely the result of this plurality, which in some states of neurotic scrupu-
losity is sensed as hypocrisy. We move endlessly from one program to another
the way we change channels on the radio, but we do it without realizing it”
(P. Veyne, 1988 [1983]: 86). From a 100% possibility, there is a rapid drop to
5% or 0%... Indifferent to inherent contradiction, the belief makes this flexibility
all the easier, without in any way compromising the individual’s sincerity.
One point should be stressed. Analysis of this real life “management” reveals
that these statements are reconstituted outside of any act of believing, that is to
say outside of belief situations, in so far as they are not affected by subsequent
empirical refutations or by the absence of practical consequences. As Paul Veyne
says, those who can positively connect with the semi-propositional content that
places gods in the heavens would be astounded to see them in the sky, and it
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would be completely ridiculous if they hoped to see gods from the window of
a plane. If a believer, having seen Jesus appear before him, went out in search
of empirical evidence of the appearance, he or she would be abandoning the
state of belief or act of believing. He or she would in fact be taking a positivist
approach, as if incapable of imagining a world beyond the objective one. And
if a man goes to his family tomb to introduce his newborn to deceased family
members, does he really believe that they will be able to see the baby? “No”,
he would later say to someone who asked him about it. “But maybe a little”,
at the moment of the act, which is brief and cannot be fully thought through
to its conclusion. Does the man know whether or not he believes? “Lethargic
indifference”, Veyne replies (P. Veyne, 1988 [1983]: 27), reminding us that
people know very well what they should keep below the level of consciousness.
These are instances of “eschatological inconsistency”. They say a lot, not just
about the relationships between belief statements (particularly about the beyond)
and the incompletely pursued logical and/or practical consequences of the act
of believing, but also about the relationship between specific behaviours and
their corresponding mental attitudes. And none of this pertains to what might
be termed weak faith.
Personal encounters with the divine being or positive mental connections can
lead from one to the other and back again. In the course of a person’s day, they
are only limited, ephemeral moments. But the shifts away from these states of
belief also have their own modalities, which can shed light on Veyne’s remarks.
Let us look at a few of them.
The most common is no doubt detachment between the state or act of belief
and other situations into which the person can shift – what could be called the
severance principle. A person who has a mental inspiration or positive mental
connection in church about the semi-propositional content, according to which
Jesus Christ was resurrected, forgets this content on Monday morning or indeed
only a few minutes later.
A completely different context: when people read their horoscope (the appe-
tite for optimistic information about the future, or fear of an unfavourable situa-
tion) constitute an ephemeral act of adherence to semi-propositional content.
One possible reaction, stimulated by a minimal amount of critical thinking, is
scepticism or even an ironic wink of the eye, right after reading the statement
in question. As we have seen, for believers, this sort of irony and scepticism are
just as likely to generate ironic or doubtful attitudes about the idea of being
reunited with loved ones (M. Pelkmans, 2013).
Duality of attitude is another way of managing the shift out of a state of
belief into another situation. To borrow Veyne’s frequent example, when the
worship of an emperor conforms to a religious model, the emperor is not consid-
ered a god. Romans believed that divinities lived in an alternative space and
time, had no real biography and possessed mastery over the world and the future.
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Therefore they did not believe in the divinity of their emperor, even if they
considered him extraordinary enough to grant him the highest honours. Despite
occasional trembling, they proved that they were under no illusions because they
did not address ex-votos to the emperor, whereas they did offer them to their
own divinities.
Hesitation associated with distraction or indifference is another management
technique, this time the management of the co-presence of acceptance and critical
distance. A believer at church listening to the priest’s words, who is looking at
others standing and leaning, first hesitates, then enacts the ritual gesture, attempt-
ing to get into “sync”, thinking that he or she has to get into it... like the others.
Can we not relate this situation to the state of “pluralistic ignorance” in which
participants can find themselves during a ceremony? Each of them, based on his
or her own attitude – on a not entirely satisfying act of believing – keeps quiet
about spiritual dissatisfaction, simulating an optimal experience (characteristi-
cally by getting caught up in the situation), thinking that everyone else is experi-
encing the moment perfectly and genuinely. These people, all of them thinking
they are alone in lacking a relationship with God, can produce the same narrative
of a successful experience and so go along with the crowd, each of them thinking
he or she was the only one pretending... and so on (R. Stark, W. Bainbridge, 1985:
272-273).
At a higher level of consciousness than in the previous situations, the object
of the act of believing (for example expecting the arrival of extra-terrestrial
beings or hoping for the advent of an ideal ecological society) runs up against
reality (they did not come, it was not realised). In this case the act of believing
can, in different circumstances, morph into a firm conviction that is asserted,
detailed, dogmatised and made the subject of a demand for respect.
Searching for proof is another way of effecting the shift from the state of
belief to another situation. Depending on the mental attitude in question, it
consists in searching for traces of a UFO landing, taking photos of the sky that
could confirm the appearance of the divine being, developing physical theories
to demonstrate the “ontological” reality of what people report in accounts of
near-death experiences. It can also quite simply be a matter of reading the history
of the life of Jesus or visiting landmarks of the beginnings of Christianity. These
proofs do not only concern the credibility of witnesses, they are also about demon-
strating the authenticity of the testimony, employing experimental approaches that
are sometimes complex.
The very isolated moment of the state of belief is reflected in an array of
everyday behaviours, attitudes and rules for living, for example in charitable acts.
These behaviours, directly imputable to the intensity of a past act of believing
or indirectly associated with an interest in one or another semi-propositional
representation kept at the back of the mind, can also demonstrate a skill for
deciphering signs in life’s small events.
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The rhetorical use of the divine metaphor can take on different forms. It is
used ironically, without any real comparison to the religious referent, such as
when journalists or fans comment on the exploits of a football player. In “New
Age” groups, divine appellations (“cosmic energy”, “universal spirit”) can be used
as relevant metaphors, not so much for their underlying truth as for the dynamism,
security and meaning they can bring. But this is just as possible with religious
beliefs 3.
Conclusion: a theory of Homo religiosus
No one says that Alice, the one who went to Wonderland, exists. The believer
says that God exists. This almost mundane statement points to the specificity of
divine beings and religious belief. In a way, if there were nothing but religions
with various messages and gestures directed at God, one would almost be temp-
ted to categorise gods as fictional characters. But unlike the latter, God continues
to “exist” and to be present in various ways before and after the ritual, before and
after the reading of a story. On the subject of divinities, people are quite capable
of saying in all seriousness that they exist. Believing is not just playing along,
doing the “done thing” during a ceremony, it’s also attributing a non-fictional
status to the divinity outside of the ceremony. This is the first “little more”. But
there is another one: underlying all social validations, transmission rationales
and personal accounts, belief constitutes a private and mental experience. Believ-
ing means doing it and a little more. A strong characteristic of belief resides
precisely in this “little more”, several levels of which make up belief and particu-
larly the believer: the reality, outside of the human world, of existences that are
not confirmed and not confirmable; moments of co-presence with these entities –
a co-presence that is sensed or simply automatised; isolated moments of accept-
ance felt at the thought of these existences, or proclaimed acceptance; the day-
to-day dynamics of this acceptance and co-presence. This particular “a little more”
is crucial: actual sensed and felt moments of acceptance, their daily occurrence,
their mental experience in real life. The act of believing as a moment of accept-
ance is this extra, and it is hard to reach. The social sciences, moreover, risk
overlooking it, dissolving this moment into rituals, representations, statements
or social rationales. But it is this risk that an anthropology of belief must avoid.
At certain moments, individuals who trust the orthodoxy of the church can genu-
inely believe in the resurrection of Jesus. They can have positive mental connec-
tions with this semi-propositional content. At other moments they can be ironic
about their attitude, or search for historical proof of the resurrection, or hesitate
about how their belief should be formulated between metaphor and literalism.
3. Therefore it does not seem relevant to me to separate systems of representations (or of
interactions), sometimes called “ontologies”, from modalities of believing and adherence.
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After a critical process, they might retain only the core of church dogmas and
only believe in the existence of God by means of positive mental connections.
They may also believe either that Jesus was resurrected, or that he was not. A
religious statement can also become a kind of floating idea disconnected from
the church’s authority. In this respect, the individual may believe X anyway,
perhaps really believing, but also metaphorically adapting its formulation when
speaking about it. In other cases, the idea can resonate through actions and
interpretations of everyday events. This makes it possible to visualise a large
number of combinations in the rectangle below.
The difficult phenomenography of acts of believing requires that one looks
at the subtle complexity that results from the interweaving between statements
of belief, different modalities used for approving them (really believing, not
believing, believing anyway) and the different forms of “shifting” (into distrac-
tion, scepticism, irony, the search for proof, detachment). Can these avenues be
useful for exploring the modalities of belief? Fascinating comparisons between
various religious worlds could be attempted on the basis of possible combina-
tions of characteristics from each corner of the rectangle.
Michael Stausberg is right: theories of religion are often avoided by scholars
of religion (M. Stausberg, 2010). But let us go a little further in concluding this
article. With the idea of oscillation and hesitation, do we not have a principal
characteristic of religious activity? What religious people experience seems to
occur as if it were overshadowed by a message that said: “it’s not that”. Fiction?
No, it’s not that! Reality? No, it’s not that! And so on... While the ritual is being
performed, they communicate that it is not fiction; at the very moment when
God becomes present, they say he is absent; at the very moment when people
are bringing the divinity to life through their meditations, it is presented as an
independent entity in relation to human beings. This play of negations is in fact
central. Traditional definitions of religion then become questionable. Let us take
a few examples. First, there are the definitions that concern how religious state-
ments are received. I am thinking of the intellectualist school of leading British
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anthropologists from the past century, like Taylor or Frazer, who claimed that
religion was an attempt to explain the world and nature rationally, and that for
lack of data and knowledge, and through an error of reasoning, these explana-
tions failed and were gradually replaced. All of this as if the gestures and state-
ments in question literally meant what they did and said without any metaphorical
impact, and as if individuals had no critical abilities... There are also interpreta-
tions that stress the nature of statements or practices, as in the case of symbolic
interpretation, which sees these irrational figurations as nothing but symbolic
expressions, metaphors that contain a hidden message that the anthropologist
must find. This perspective is not much different from the idea of literal reception
by people who lack critical abilities, and who are of course fooled by this meta-
phorical meaning. These types of interpretation err not only by analytically over-
looking people’s critical abilities, but also by characterising gods ambivalently.
Thus they are positions on the nature of religion which are taken without an
understanding of the people’s opinions.
A third type of interpretation could also be mentioned, that which focuses
on an actual definition of religion and more particularly on a specific mediation
of the representation of the divine being. Here the danger is that religious activity
will be defined and limited by a single feature. This could be the identification
of god with a personification of society and with a visible manifestation of the
communion of minds (É. Durkheim, 2008 [1912]). It could also be the associa-
tion of religious activity with beliefs that are legitimised in reference to tradition
(D. Hervieu-Léger, 2000 [1993]) or even, as is the case for a number of authors,
in reference to a ritual and symbolic link with a “higher power”. In each case,
these definitions make a general characterisation of religion out of a localised
element of discussion, out of a particular mediation, whereas in reality this ele-
ment only exists and is only present in relation to and in dialogue with other
elements to which they necessarily refer. Ethnographic fieldwork examining reli-
gious activity reveals this reflexive play of oscillation. It teaches us that the actors
themselves are constantly asking questions.
Thus I would like to draw attention to the impact of negation in order to
understand the existential reality of Homo religiosus. Passing in front of a posi-
tive pole, he is immediately driven to a negative pole according to a process of
oscillation marked by back-and-forth movements and hesitation. Is the person
acting as if there is a visible, tangible divine being before him? But he or she
does not see the divinity and cannot touch it; it is even pointed out to him or
her that the mediation is not really God, only a trace to which he or she should
not become attached, and is told to keep on searching. Will our “believer” then
start to think that there is “nothing at all”, nothing real, only spectacle and
fiction? But this fiction itself comes with the message that it is not really a fiction
and that the divine being is represented by a diverse array of signs. This circula-
tion can be seen in the following diagram:
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In religious activity, there is no direct, one-way path from fiction to reality
(or vice versa) that would be the equivalent of saying: “It isn’t fiction, it’s real”.
This would be a positivist approach that consists in associating the divine being
with a raw, objective fact and leaving it at that. In the other direction, it would
be an atheistic approach, associating God with fiction: “it isn’t real, it’s fiction”.
There is, however, a semi-direct line that consists in starting from fiction, going
towards non-fiction, then going down the endless path of representations (the
left-hand vertical line), endless because it never arrives at reality (even if occa-
sional stops are possible). A process that is more complicated – or at least more
sceptical – consists in oscillating between non-reality, fiction and non-fiction (it’s
not a fiction but it’s not real either). The striped zone, between the two negative
poles (it’s not spectacle, but it’s not reality either), is no doubt strongly represent-
ative of ordinary religion. Even from there, it is possible to make excursions
towards fiction without reaching it, or towards reality through the dismissal of
endless representations.
Then what does religion in fact consist of? Representation and fiction? The
construction of invisible beings and their presence? Hesitations and oscillations?
This is a set of things that one can most certainly find in many other social
activities. Then where is the characteristic aspect of religion to be found, if not
in one or more of these elements? My answer: it is to be found in how they are
placed in circulation by the play of negation. Religious existence thus finds itself
in a permanent in-between. Humans, like gods, can only exist on the move, in
oscillation, in a state of ambiguity. This is what an exploration of French Catholic
beliefs and acts of believing enabled me to see. Comparisons between religions
would be interesting to make.
Albert PIETTE
Laboratoire d’ethnologie et de sociologie comparative
Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense
piettealbert@hotmail.com
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An Anthropology of Belief and a Theory of Homo Religiosus
This article examines the modalities of belief on the basis of an ethnographic study
of French Catholics. The author distinguishes the nature of religious statements, the
modes of discourse people use to express their beliefs, and the personal modalities
of acts of believing, which are isolated moments followed by various shifts into other
activities, characterised by irony, doubt or detachment with regard to beliefs. The
article concludes with a depiction of religious activity as a displacement, a hesitation,
a perpetual oscillation between fiction and reality, believing and not believing,
presence and absence.
Key words: believing, anthropology, Catholicism, religion, oscillation, hesitation,
theory.
L’anthropologie de la croyance et la théorie de l’homo religiosus
Cet article examine les modalités de la croyance sur la base d’une étude ethno-
graphique des catholiques français. L’auteur distingue la nature des déclarations reli-
gieuses, des modes de discours que les gens utilisent pour exprimer leurs convictions
et des modalités personnelles d’actes de croire, qui sont des instants isolés suivis par
divers passages à d’autres activités, avec ironie, doute ou détachement à l’égard des
croyances. L’article conclut avec une représentation de l’activité religieuse comme
un déplacement, une hésitation, une oscillation perpétuelle entre fiction et réalité,
croyance et non croyance, présence et absence.
Mots-clés : croyance, anthropologie, catholicisme, religion, oscillation, hésitation,
théorie.
Antropología del creer y teoría del homo religiosus
Este artículo examina las modalidades de las creencias sobre las bases de un estudio
etnográfico de los católicos franceses. El autor distingue la naturaleza de las declara-
ciones religiosas, los modos del discurso que las personas usan para expresar sus
creencias, y las modalidades personales de los actos del creer, que son momentos
aislados seguidos por varios desplazamientos hacia otras actividades, con ironía,
duda o desinterés en relación con las creencias. Este artículo concluye con una repre-
sentación de la actividad religiosa como un desplazamiento, una vacilación, una
perpetua oscilación entre ficción y realidad, creer y no creer, presencia y ausencia.
Palabras clave: creer, antropología, catolicismo, religión, oscilación, duda, teoría.
